


ARGAGE
2018

Argumentation and Language Argumentation et langage

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS - LIVRE DES RÉSUMÉS



Cover photo: image bank, USI University, Switzerland

Printed at Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano

©Università della Svizzera italiana, USI 2018

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

LIVRE DES RÉSUMÉS

ARGUMENTATION AND LANGUAGE CONFERENCE
(2ND EDITION)

7-9 February 2018

Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano (Switzerland)

COLLOQUE
ARGUMENTATION ET LANGAGE

(2e ÉDITION)

7-9 février 2018

Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano (Suisse)

Funded by



Supported by



ARGAGE 2018 INTRODUCTION

Building on the success of the first ARGAGE conference, held at the University of Lausanne in 2015, the goal of the conference is to further explore the intersections of argumentative and language practices. Scholars are therefore invited to submit proposals dealing with the interrelations between language (its units, its levels, its functions and modes of processing) and the way argumentation functions.

Contributions are related to, at least, one of the following five research axes:

1. Argumentation in spoken interaction
2. Semantics and argumentation
3. Argumentative indicators
4. Corpora annotation and argumentation
5. Rhetorical devices

Steering Committee

Sara Greco, Thierry Herman, Jérôme Jacquin, Johanna Miecznikowski, Steve Oswald & Andrea Rocci

The Conference series was initiated by *the Collectif Romand de Recherches sur l'Argumentation* (CoRRReA; Herman, Jacquin, Micheli, Oswald).

Local Organising Committee

Andrea Rocci, Sara Greco, Johanna Miecznikowski, Chiara Pollaroli, Emma van Bijnen

Scientific committee

Ruth Amossy, Corina Andone, Lilian Bermejo Luque, Marc Bonhomme, Katarzyna (Kasia) Budzynska, Sara Cigada, Arnulf Deppermann, Louis de Saussure, Didier Maillat, Marianne Doury, Jeanne Fahnestock, James B. Freeman, Bart Garssen, Sara Greco, Jean Goodwin, Ton van Haften, Chris Hart, Thierry Herman, Jos Hornikx, Jérôme Jacquin, Manfred Kienpointner, Kati Hannken-Illjes, Alfredo Lescano, Marcin Lewinski, Martin Luginbühl, Fabrizio Macagno, Hugo Mercier, Raphaël Micheli, Johanna Miecznikowski, Dima Mohammed, Elena Musi, Steve Oswald, Manuel Padilla-Cruz, Fabio Paglieri, Rudi Palmieri, Christian Plantin, Chiara Pollaroli, François Provenzano, Pierre-Yves Raccah, Anne Reboul, Eddo Rigotti, Andrea Rocci, Corine Rossari, Margot Salsmann, Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Manfred Stede, Christopher Tindale, Assimakis Tseronis, Frans van Eemeren, Jan Albert van Laar, Jean Wagemans, Douglas Walton, Galia Yanoshevsky, Marta Zampa, David Zarefsky.



PROGRAM OVERVIEW

February 7, 2018

8:30 – 9:00	Conference registration (3 rd level, USI main building)
9:00 – 9:30	Welcome speech by the Rector Prof. Boas Erez Introduction by the Steering Committee (Auditorium)
9:30 – 10:30	Plenary lecture: Christian Plantin (FR) Discussion (Auditorium)
10:30 – 11:00	Coffee break (3 rd level, USI main building)
11:00 – 12:30	Sessions
12:30 – 14:30	Lunch (2 nd level, Mensa)
14:30 – 16:00	Sessions
16:00 – 16:30	Coffee break (3 rd level, USI main building)
16:30 – 18:00	Sessions
18:00 – 19:00	Reception (3 rd level, USI main building)

February 8, 2018

9:00 – 10:00	Plenary lecture: Manfred Stede (EN) Discussion (Auditorium)
10:00 – 10:30	Coffee break (3 rd level, USI main building)
10:30 – 12:30	Sessions
12:30 – 14:30	Lunch (2 nd level, Mensa)
14:30 – 15:30	Plenary lecture: Jeanne Fahnestock (EN) Discussion (Auditorium)
15:30 – 16:00	Coffee break (3 rd level, USI main building)
16:00 – 18:00	Sessions
19:00	Social dinner (Il Canvetto Luganese)

February 9, 2018

9:00 – 10:00	Plenary lecture: Ton van Haften (EN) Discussion (Auditorium)
10:00 – 10:30	Coffee break (3 rd level, USI main building)
10:30 – 12:00	Sessions
12:00 – 12:30	Closing remarks, announcements (Auditorium)

KEYNOTES

Jeanne Fahnestock (University of Maryland, United States of America)

From Epitome to Amplification: Rhetorical Poles in the Language of Argument

It is easy to generate data about the language of a text but not always easy to determine how selected features serve a text's communicative function. We can compile statistics on word frequencies, register features, syntactic patterns, agent/action pairings, pronoun choices and more from a single text of a few hundred words, and the prospects are overwhelming with large corpora. Obviously analysts have to start with a strong sense of what they are looking, at least provisionally. What suggestions are offered in the rhetorical tradition on the linguistic devices that have potential persuasive significance?

From antiquity through the early modern period, rhetorical manuals feature two trajectories of advice for persuasive language. The first promotes the succinct, epitomizing statement of a line of argument and the second recommends its amplification through heightening and expanding. Quintilian, for example, offers advice on these two tendencies in the *Institutio Oratoria*, and early modern rhetorics like Melanchthon's *Elementorum Rhetorices* (1539) link certain topoi to figures of speech while recommending strategies for elaboration. The epitomizing figures point to a "figural logic" while the amplification advice provides models for the expansion of core arguments into modular units of text. These argumentative units persist across argument fields and rhetorical situations.

However forms of reasoning can appear in many guises. How a particular line of argument can be expressed, or just suggested, can be sampled in the case of the dissociation arguments described in *The New Rhetoric* by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. Dissociations can be epitomized in certain figures of the speech (e.g., the *antanaclasis*, *agnominatio* and *trductio*), but they can also exist in subtler and incomplete forms as the argumentative force of linguistic cues depends on context and audience, always a matter of speculative reconstruction. But going even further, if a rhetorical approach uses the entire range of technique considered crucial in manuals like Quintilian's, it must also consider the prosody of a text, the way its rhythmic patterns suggest the range of intensity in the human voice, from urgency and commitment to slackness and distance. There may, in other words, be less in the actual words of an argument and more in the rhythm of the wording that helps to deliver a persuasive argument. Thus from epitome and amplification to the underwriting sound, the rhetorical tradition helps analysts in their search for the language of argument.

Ton van Haften (Leiden University (LUCL), the Netherlands)

Strategic maneuvering with stylistic choices in Dutch political discussions

The extended pragma-dialectical argumentation theory assumes that people engaged in argumentative discourse maneuver strategically. 'Strategic Maneuvering' refers to the efforts arguers make in argumentative discourse to reconcile rhetorical effectiveness with the maintenance of dialectical standards of reasonableness. In order not to let one objective prevail over the other, the parties try to strike a balance between them at every discussion stage of resolving their differences of opinion: the confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding stage.

Strategic maneuvering manifests itself in argumentative discourse in: (a) the choices that are made from the topical potential, (b) audience-directed framing of argumentative moves and (c) the use of presentational devices (Van Eemeren 2010: 93-127). The strategic exploitation of presentational devices pertains to the communicative means that are used in presenting the argumentative

moves, especially the stylistic choices arguers make.

Dutch political discussions, for example parliamentary and election debates, can in general be characterized as rather formal and clinical, without much use of *conspicuous* stylistic choices. This way of debating, and the do's and don'ts of it, originate from the shaping of the modern Dutch parliament during the second half of the 19th century. At several points in history, this dominant and traditional style of political debate has been challenged by left or right-wing political parties as a whole, or by individual politicians. These parties or individuals make a substantial and strategic use of conspicuous stylistic choices and, in doing so, often annoy and confuse the majority of other Dutch politicians (Van Haaften 2011).

But the fact that the adherents of the traditional style of political debate themselves make less use of conspicuous stylistic choices, does not mean that their stylistic choices are not strategic as well. As Van Eemeren (2010: 119) points out correctly, each stylistic choice - also the less or non-conspicuous ones - serves the purpose of framing the argumentative move that is formulated in such a way that it introduces a particular perspective; cases that are stylistically "neutral" do not exist

On the basis of systematic stylistic analyses of a sample of Dutch political discussions I will argue that the adherents of the traditional style of political debate and the challengers thereof employ different and conflicting *stylistic discussion strategies*: coordinated modes of strategic maneuvering with stylistic choices designed to influence the result of a particular discussion stage, or the discussion as a whole.

Christian Plantin (Université Lyon 2 CNRS, France)

Minimisation et maximisation comme stratégies argumentatives-émotionnelles

Cette présentation est fondée sur le concept de la *situation* argumentative, comme une situation *dialogique* complexe, ouverte par une *question* argumentative. Une question argumentative est une question à laquelle les parties donnent des *réponses* argumentées, peut-être également bien formées, raisonnables et rationnelles, mais néanmoins incompatibles. Ces réponses expriment les *conclusions* (points de vue) des locuteurs sur la question, et les discours pro- et contra- qui entourent et soutiennent ces conclusions ont le statut *d'argument*.

L'étude des schèmes d'argumentation attache à juste titre une grande importance aux principes assurant la cohésion de l'articulation argument-conclusion, et d'abord à la condition de propositionnalité, l'argument étant donné comme une «bonne raison» indépendante à l'appui de la conclusion. Les concepts de *présence* (Perelman et Olbrechts-Tyteca) d'*éclairage* (Grize), et d'*orientation* (Anscombe-Ducrot), pointent vers différents types de phénomènes qui ne semblent pas entrer naturellement dans le cadre d'une analyse en termes de bonnes raisons.

Globalement, l'exagération et l'euphémisation approfondissent ou réduisent les oppositions discursives. Cette question est discutée depuis la *Rhétorique* où Aristote observe que la maximisation pourrait être utilisée pour renforcer une accusation (intensification, *très*) ou pour détruire une accusation (comme une caricature, une exagération, *trop*).

Cette présentation se concentrera sur la maximisation et la minimisation en tant qu'instruments de *dé légitimation* du débat. La minimisation de la pertinence (matérielle, morale, sociale ...) de la question tend à réduire à néant le débat comme une perte de temps inutile sur une question minime. Elle détourne en particulier les intensités émotionnelles associées à la discussion (invitation à se calmer, Bentham, stratégies *ad quietem*). Un exemple est tiré d'une séance de conciliation sur un problème d'augmentation de loyer.

Les arguments et les conclusions peuvent être présentés non comme des déclarations (dans des phrases déclaratives) mais comme des *exclamations*, que l'on trouve dans des échanges polémiques, mais pas exclusivement. L'exclamation peut être considérée comme un maximiseur

typique du tour non dialectique pris par exemple par un locuteur situant son intervention dans le

registre de l'indignation. On propose un exemple tiré d'une intervention virulente sur la question des indemnisations obtenues par les victimes américaines de la Shoah (exemple provenant du site Internet de Dieudonné).

Manfred Stede (University of Potsdam, Germany)

Extracting argumentation structures from text automatically: Achievements and Limitations

The computational task of automatically finding arguments in text and identifying their structure (argumentation mining) has enjoyed increasing popularity in recent years. In line with common research practice in Computational Linguistics, this is largely due to the presence of sufficiently large amounts of manually-annotated data (so that machine learning algorithms can be trained). Genres that have been tackled include student essays, newspaper editorials, various types of social media contributions, and posts on web sites that are specifically dedicated to argumentative exchanges.

We first review the schemes used for argument annotation in these text corpora, which amounts to the question of how argumentation in authentic text is being modeled. The approaches range from just marking the claims and supporting statements to the annotation of full graph structures that are designed to capture the (support and attack) relations between different statements. Then, we provide a brief overview of the performance that automatic systems have achieved so far on the datasets mentioned earlier.

Afterwards, we turn to the other side of the coin: What has not been achieved yet, and what are the reasons? Specifically, we will look into the limitations of a purely surface-linguistic analysis, which almost all the current work in Computational Linguistics adheres to. Moving from words and syntactic analyses to semantics, world knowledge, and reasoning is traditionally a problematic step in the computational analysis of language; most practical applications avoid it. The talk closes with an assessment of how feasible this strategy is for

argumentation mining, in comparison to a few tasks that have been around for a longer time now, such as machine translation and question-answering.

INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATIONS

A

Corina Andone & Sara Greco – Evading the burden of proof for persuasive purposes: the case of recommendations of the European Union (EN/FR)

University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands & Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland

This paper focuses on the study of evading the burden of proof as a rhetorical strategy intending to secure persuasion of the audience on controversial issues. We show how an arguer exploits implicit starting points which might not be shared by the addressee by ignoring to argue for them to obtain agreement. In this way, the arguer bases his argumentation on values and preferences other than the interlocutor's while acting as if common starting points apply. This makes it easier to have the standpoint accepted and even to avoid criticism.

We deal with cases of evasion of the burden of proof for persuasive purposes in the case of recommendations enacted by the European Commission to convince Member States to take measures which are controversial. Such recommendations do not have legally binding force, yet they can have practical effects (such as establishing new policies in the Member States) and legal effects (such as being used in litigation by Courts). This is particularly due to the recommendations' normative content in which a course of action is prescribed and further supported by arguments intended to persuade Member States of a political position. The EU has the burden of proof to demonstrate why Member States should accept this political position.

We proceed in two analytical steps that enable us to identify violations of the burden of proofs at two levels. First, we outline the recurrent justificatory reasons employed by the Commission when proposing measures to the Member States, and the way in which these arguments typically connect to each other. We unravel the argumentative patterns characterizing recommendations and explain how and why the way in which the arguments are combined could be potentially persuasive. Second, we explain the internal inferential configurations of single arguments and identify the implicit starting points on which the Commission relies; we consider the extent to which these might be shared by the addressees and eventually how functional these starting points might be for persuading Member States to comply with the prescribed course of action. We show that more often than not the Commission evades the burden of proof by ignoring to fulfil its fundamental obligations imposed by the legislative framework.

Our analysis of a corpus of recommendations is guided by the pragma-dialectical perspective providing us with the tools necessary for reconstructing argumentative patterns. The Argumentum Model of Topics enables us to gain knowledge of the inferential configuration of arguments.

B

Andrea Balbo – Old delivery and modern demagogy: How ancient practice of *actio* can help us to understand modern populist speakers (EN/FR)

Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland & University of Turin, Italy

No one doubts that contemporary rhetoric still bases on the five *officia oratoris*. Nonetheless, they do not share the same interest among scholars. While ancient and modern rhetoricians have studied the importance, for instance, of *inventio* and *elocutio*, delivery remains less defined in detail. Ancient sources as Aristotle's *Rhetorica*, *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero's *De inventione*, *De oratore*, and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* are not always clear and consistent with its character and features. In contemporary scholarship delivery gained attraction recently for its connections to the so-called "digital rhetoric". Anyway, its role in each branch of argumentation remains pivotal. Its traditional elements like nonverbal language develop a complex rhetorical relationship between speech contents and their expression, on one side and between orator and public on the other side. Moreover, in today speeches the ancient problem of spaces of delivery becomes very important, due to the need of taking into account chances given by TV, radio, web and streaming. In my paper, I propose to approach these complex relationships focusing on a specific topic, the links between the so-called *oratoria popularis* in Rome (Gracchi *in primis*, but not only: see for instance J-M. David, "Eloquentia popularis" *et conduits symboliques des orateurs de la fin de la République: problèmes d'efficacité*, «QS» 12 (1980), pp. 171- 198; J. M. Roddaz, "Popularis", *populisme, popularité* in *Popolo e potere nel mondo antico*, Pisa, 2005, 97-122) and the populist political oratory of our times (see for instance B. Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance*,

Political Style, and Representation, Stanford 2016 . After a short introduction concerning the main elements of delivery and nonverbal languages based on P. Ekman, and W. Friesen works I will define the *oratoria popularis*, i.e. the type of oratory belonging to *factio popularis*, focusing also the idea that a popularis way of speaking involves complex meanings and not always a negative evaluation. Then I will analyze some very brief examples of populist speeches in Italy (B. Grillo) and in USA (D. Trump), in order to show how much they are close to this type of rhetorical delivery – even unknowingly – and how their persuasive skills are strongly based on a specific use of gestures, body, voices in connection with mass media. In the end, shortly I will try to categorize some elements of what we could call “demagogic” delivery, identifying some constant elements that return after centuries in similar ways.

Kira Boulat & Didier Maillat – Committed speakers make for stronger arguments: an experimental pragmatics investigation of commitment

University of Fribourg, Switzerland

Commitment captures the idea that communicators constantly assess and infer the degree to which they - as well as other people - are committed to an argument. Commitment has been shown to be central to argumentation theory through the work of Hamblin (1970) or Walton & Krabbe (1995). Revising the existing models, we will argue a) that commitment is a graded notion and b) that the inferred degree of commitment is cognitively encoded. Specifically, we posit that the epistemic strength of an argument corresponds to a form of cognitive strength (see Wilson & Sperber 2012). First we will offer a revised theoretical framework to account for these phenomena. Following up on proposals made by Morency et al. (2011) and Moeschler (2013) and Sperber et al. (2010), we define the scope of a pragmatic and cognitive approach to commitment within a relevance-theoretic framework. We then identify a series of linguistic markers which can serve as diagnostics of speaker commitment and which are used by the hearer to assess the argument and infer his own commitment to it. Thus, if S says *I am certain that P*, it is assumed that the cognitive representation of *P* is cognitively stronger than if S says *I have heard that P*.

In the second part, we turn to experimental pragmatics to evaluate the predictions of this model in two experimental designs. Using a recognition paradigm we show that the ability to accurately recognise a previous argument *P* deteriorates significantly as epistemic strength - expressed in terms of certainty of information and reliability of speaker - weakens. We argue that these findings are in line with the predictions of the model and confirm the cognitive underpinnings of commitment.

C

Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet – Legislative intentions and counterfactuals

Università Bocconi, Italy

In 1889 the New York Court of Appeals had to decide whether Elmer Palmer could inherit under the will of his grandfather even though Elmer had murdered him to do so. The Court admitted that the New York statute of wills, if literally construed, gave the property to the murderer. But the Court also claimed that, if such a case had been present to the minds of the New York legislators “and it had been supposed necessary to make some provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they would have provided for it”.

That is an argument from counterfactual intention used to justify the claim that the literal meaning of the statute did not rule the case. Now the question is: Is this argument justified? According to the argument from legislative intention, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker’s intention. What about counterfactual intentions? More generally, what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this argumentative device?

The problem is that different counterfactual intentions might be ascribed to a legislature. It seems likely that the New York legislators did not have the case of murderers in mind at all. But, without further information, we can imagine countless worlds which agree in the feature that the New York legislators considered the murderer case by enacting the statute of wills, and differ in other respects. We can imagine a possible world W1 in which the legislators subscribed to some maxims of the common law (as the maxim “no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong”) and prohibited a murderer to inherit. But also a possible world W2 in which the legislators permitted a murderer to inherit because, using the argument actually advanced by Judge Gray in his dissenting opinion, a prohibition “would involve the imposition of an

additional punishment or penalty” upon the murderer. So, one might think, anything goes with this argument.

We will try to address these issues determining the justification conditions of the counterfactual intention argument in the context of a legal exchange of reasons.

Sara Cigada – Les Arguments émotifs d’un corpus franco-libanais au prisme du Modèle AMT

Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Italy

En distinguant la composante matérielle de la composante formelle d’un discours argumentatif, le Modèle AMT « Argument Model of Topics » (Rigotti & Greco-Morasso 2010 ; Rigotti 2009) permet d’analyser l’implicite qui se cache à l’origine de la composante matérielle d’une inférence, souvent sous la forme d’un jugement émotif partagé au sein de la communauté de discours (les « implicites culturels » ou *éndoxxa*). Deuxièmement, par le Modèle AMT il est possible d’analyser la procédure formelle, en appliquant des maximes (issues d’un *topos*) à tout type de prémisse matérielle. L’avantage du Modèle AMT serait donc d’analyser les arguments émotifs exactement par les mêmes outils employés pour d’autres arguments. Plus particulièrement, on pourrait évaluer la validité d’une argumentation émotive en distinguant la validité de l’*éndoxxon* (composante matérielle) de celle de l’inférence (composante formelle).

L’implicite étant culturellement marqué, nous avons choisi un corpus qui a une collocation très précise au sein de la communauté de référence : le témoignage d’une enseignante de collège parisienne, après les attentats du janvier 2015. Le discours a été enregistré dans le contexte d’un projet de coopération éducative internationale francophone, entre l’Italie, la France et le Liban (*S’éduquer pour éduquer 2014-2017*). En outre, nous considérerons quelques passages des questionnaires remplis par les enseignants libanais après la projection du témoignage.

Du point de vue opératoire, il faut tout d’abord délinéer, au sein de la notion d’« argument émotif », le rapport entre émotion et argument, en distinguant les émotions qui sont interprétées et traitées comme des arguments, des émotions qui font la conclusion d’une argumentation. Dans ce texte [*Devant le tombeau de Lazare*] Jésus *pleure*. Sur quoi les Juifs dirent : Voyez comme il l’*aimait* (Jean 11,35-36), par exemple, on reconnaît un terme indirecte d’émotion (*pleurer*), indiquant un syndrome de la tristesse (qui n’est pas évoquée explicitement). La tristesse est l’argument pour la conclusion : *il l’aimait*. Ce dernier terme d’émotion est un terme direct, utilisé ici pour la conclusion de l’inférence. L’émotion de la tristesse est un argument, celle de l’amour une conclusion.

L’évocation des deux émotions est faite par deux types différents de terme, selon la description de Plantin (2010) : *pleurer* évoque indirectement la tristesse, *aimer* dénomme directement l’émotion concernée. Dans d’autres cas, l’évocation discursive des émotions se fait par la situation et la personne concernées (composante matérielle) et par des maximes (composante formelle), ce que nous étudions, au prisme du Modèle AMT.

G

Carlo Galimberti, Antonio Bova, Carmen Spanò, Daniela Tacchi, & Ilaria Vergine – The Direct Address in the TV series *House of Cards*: How to deal with a Polydimensional Phenomenon and make an Object of Research out of it

Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Italy

The direct address – a construction in which a speaker or writer communicates a message directly to the audience (Marriott, 2007) – constitutes one of the most interesting dramaturgical techniques used in performative arts. Media researchers consider it an ideal crossroad for the articulation of the diegetic and extra-diegetic dimensions of a media text. This paper will present a multiperspective analysis of the argumentative and dialogical dimensions of this specific technique to point out its effects on audience’s responses in the American TV series *House of Cards* (2013 – in production). As known, in the construction of its storylines, this original Netflix series intensively employs the direct address. In our opinion, the use of this technique affects: 1) the development of the plot and the building process of the male protagonist Frank Underwood; 2) the distribution of information between characters and viewers, as a condition that exemplifies the blurring of diegetic and extra-diegetic; 3) the production of central elements of the series’ narrative like suspense, twists, and narrative peaks.

In this study, we consider the dynamics engendered by Frank Underwood’s direct addresses taking into consideration their argumentative and conversational nature. In particular, we highlight the

interweave of the cognitive, psycho-social and cultural dimensions that characterize Underwood's interpellations. The conversational pair composed by a direct interpellation (1st turn of speech) and the online comment(s) made as a form of response to it by the show's fans on the social media (2nd turn of speech) constitute our unity of analysis (Meredith and Potter, 2014). 'Poliphonic' and/or 'polilogic' online comments made by fans in social media's posts, are considered as 3rd turns of speech.

Final intent of the analysis is to:

- a) show how the direct interpellations generate dialogical dynamics of polilogical nature by connecting Frank's character with the audience and vice versa
- b) investigate the effects of the dialogical dynamics as described at the point a) on the relation between diegetic and extradiegetic elements
- c) show that the polydimensional nature of the direct address can be dealt with by means of a polydimensional approach articulating and integrating Argumentation Theory (van Eemeren, 2010), Discourse Analysis (Schreier, 2012), Conversation Analysis (Interlocutory Analysis, Trognon & al., 2011), and Media Studies (Eugeni, 2008).

These objectives will be achieved presenting the analysis of two scenes of direct addresses selected from the first season of House of Cards and online fan-characters exchanges.

H

Kati Hannken-Illjes & Ines Bose – Argumentation between agonality and cooperation (EN/FR)

Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany

Dissensus is considered a defining feature of argumentation, distinguishing it from other forms of reason-giving like explaining. At the same time, the ways in which dissensus is established in interaction may differ considerably from open agonality to cooperative situations, in which the dissensus can only be reconstructed implicitly. In our study, we are interested in the ways different grades of dissenting are established in interaction. The distinction between different grades of dissensus in argumentation has been discussed in argumentation theory for quite some time. With respect to the development of argumentative competence as well as the teaching of argumentative skills in school, Ehlich (2002) distinguishes between persuasive and explorative argumentation. For Ehlich, persuasive argumentation aims at establishing divergence, whereas explorative argumentation establishes convergence. This distinction seems especially important when studying argumentation and proto-argumentation among children in child-child interaction, as research into the development of argumentative competence has mainly focused on agonal settings rather than cooperative ones, thereby missing important forms of early argumentative conduct. In this paper we aim at refining this distinction by describing different forms of framing argumentative interaction rather agonal or rather cooperative.

Methodologically we choose a multimodal approach to argumentative interaction, with a special focus on prosodic features. Although a relatively new strand in argumentation analysis, multimodal analysis may support a more detailed and more precise analysis of argumentation in interaction.

The paper is grounded in our joint research project on the establishment of validity through argumentation in authentic child-child communication. The project works with two longitudinal corpora of child-child communication (3.0 – 7.0). The children are videographed in play interaction: either role-play, play with props or building games. Our data shows, that the paraverbal and extraverbal analysis is crucial in order to analyse the frame the children use. Especially the difference and change between cooperative and agonal framings is reflected in the prosodic, vocal and bodily demeanor.

In our talk we shall make a twofold argument: first, that "dissensus" is a gradual concept rather than an absolute one and second, that in order to make statements about the development of argumentation competence, argumentation in frames leaning toward the cooperative pole should gain more attention.

Stefan Hauser & Martin Luginbühl – On specifying competence levels of oral argumentation skills – indications from a quantitative analysis of elementary school children in Switzerland *University of Teacher Education Zug, Switzerland & University of Basel, Switzerland*

There is a broad consensus that oral argumentation skills are important competences for learning (Nussbaum 2008, Muller Mirza / Perret-Clermont 2009, Schwarz / Baker 2017) and in everyday life (van Eemeren / Garsson 2015). Although the fostering of these skills is an integral element of

educational standards (e.g. in the American National Science Education standards or in the European Parliaments recommendation), there is still only little empirical data on the acquisition of oral argumentation skills of young school children (see literature review in Rapanta / Garcia-Mila / Gilabert 2013). In our paper we will present a project that aims at providing an empirical basis for the development of different competence levels as well as insights into the age-related acquisition of children's (aged 7-12) oral argumentation skills. Basis of our analysis are 180 video recorded group discussions of pupils from the second, fourth and sixth grade (age 7-12) in groups of four pupils. The discussions among the school children were conducted without the presence of adults. The data have been analyzed within the frameworks of Conversation Analysis (e.g. Sidnell/Stivers 2013).

In a first part we will discuss theoretical considerations regarding the specifics of oral argumentation, such as its interactive dynamic (see Andrews 2005, Spranz-Fogasy 2006, Heller 2012), especially the co-construction of arguments (see Amossy 2009) or strategic sequences (see Felton/Kuhn 2001). We will also address the question of which partial skills should be discerned in argumentation (like the complexity of different argumentation formats or argumentative coherence, see Grundler 2011) and to what extent conversation analysis is able to capture individual competences.

In a second part we will present the research design and present findings of our quantitative analysis regarding different competence levels. Our main research question will be, to what extent a CA based quantitative analysis can be used as indicator for competence levels of oral argumentation skills. We will also address methodological issues with regard to the potentials and limitations of quantitative conversation analysis in general (Stivers 2015).

Thierry Herman & Dimitris Serafis – Arguing emotions through non-argumentative headlines: evidence from newspapers during the Greek crisis

University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland

According to significant theoretical perceptions, the three artistic proofs of Aristotle's rhetoric - *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos* – can be considered as essential components of language rather than specific uses of it in specific situations. Indeed, some of them argue that *logos* is embedded in language (Anscombe & Ducrot 1983; Anscombe 2001; Carel 2011) while others assume that *ethos* can be analyzed in every utterance (Amossy 2016).

In this communication, we suggest that the category of “argued emotion” (Micheli 2014) may also pave the way for a more radical view on *pathos* within language. Such a view is possible if we accept the following premises: 1. Emotions are an intrinsic part of argumentation: Plantin argues for an extension of the domain of argumentation whose aims are not only what people will do or believe after a persuasive speech, but also what they should feel about the issue (Plantin 1999; Micheli 2010: 109-110); 2. A background topic of emotions might justify or legitimate reasons that we have to feel an emotion. For example, “This 3-year-old child is lost,” is non-only a descriptive stance but also an argument underpinning an emotion of *fear* due to a “topic of emotions” described by Micheli (2010).

Under these theoretical assumptions, we analyze factual headlines which lead the way to this theoretical hindsight about emotions in discourse and about apparent non-argumentative utterances that do, nevertheless, argue for a standpoint. We sketch an integrationist analytical framework based on two main analytical pillars: we conduct a Systemic-Functional (SF) analysis to scrutinize discursive representations, provided by the transitivity structures (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: Ch. 5) of headlines. Then we complement the SF analysis by a rhetorical analysis of semiotization of emotions (Micheli's model of “argued emotions” in particular) in order to track constructed emotions upon discursive representations in newspaper headlines and capture their argumentative force (Micheli 2010, 2014; Plantin 2004, 2011). Among our major findings is that, although we deal with non-argumentative discursive structures (i.e. headlines), the discursive representations give rise to a dense emotional construction which legitimates the positioning of the newspapers to the audience. We provide illustrative examples of such implementations.

Jos Hornikx – Cognitive representations of argumentation schemes

Radboud University, the Netherlands

Framework

Rhetoricians and philosophers have made extensive analyses of argumentative discourse around the notion of ‘argumentation schemes’, which were developed as early as Greek Antiquity by Aristotle. This scheme-based approach presents various rich catalogues of different arguments,

such as the ‘argument from expert opinion’ or the ‘argument from similarity’. The scheme-based approach assumes that the schemes are patterns of inferences that people make in argumentative discourse. Interestingly, we do not know much about how people actually reason with arguments. In this paper, I propose a theory of the cognitive toolbox for argumentative reasoning. The theory holds that reasoners have a fine-grained cognitive toolbox of instruments to evaluate the variation of potential arguments in discourse. According to this theory, people reason with arguments on the basis of a cognitive toolbox that contains cognitive representations of argumentation schemes. I argue that, more than on the basis of notions such as the length of the argument, or the relevance and sufficiency, people reason with arguments on the basis of cognitive representations of argumentation schemes. That is, when reasoners are faced with a number of arguments, the theory predicts that people recognize that some arguments are more similar than others, and/or that some arguments can be grouped together. Also, the theory assumes that reasoners apply this knowledge of argumentation schemes to their evaluation and to their production of arguments.

Research question

However intuitively appealing, the existence of argumentation schemes has not been explored from a cognitive perspective. That is to say, we do not know whether the argumentation schemes have a mental representation in the reasoner’s mind. If schemes have such a representation, they can be considered as tools in people’s toolbox for argumentative reasoning. This is related to the second research axis of the conference, as it is about the way laypeople semantically describe argumentation schemes.

Methodology

The paper outlines the theory, building on work in argumentation and in cognitive psychology. It also develops propositions on the psychological reality, evaluation, and production of argumentation schemes, and it provides suggestions for how to empirically test these propositions.

Originality

The paper explicit links cognitive perspectives of reasoning to the domain of argumentation. It presents a novel theory, and introduces an original research question that is relevant to the study of argumentation schemes.

J

Jérôme Jacquin – Epistemic stancetaking in argumentative talk-in-interaction. “Je sais” [I know] in French live and TV debates (FR/EN)

University of Lausanne, Switzerland

Diverses analyses discursives et interactionnelles de débats publics ou télévisés ont montré que l’activité de débattre relève d’une confrontation — plus ou moins médiée par un tiers — entre des locuteurs soutenant des positions antagonistes qu’ils justifient par des arguments et qu’ils situent dans le désaccord (Burger, Jacquin, & Micheli, 2011; Doury & Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2011; Greatbatch, 1992; Hutchby, 1996; Jacquin, 2014). Dans un tel contexte, on s’attendrait à ce que les locuteurs cherchent à marquer régulièrement leur connaissance du sujet abordé, voire leur autorité en la matière. L’exploration statistique d’un corpus francophone d’une dizaine d’heures de débats publics et télévisés tenus en Suisse romande révèle toutefois la présence de 11 occurrences de [je sais] (« je sais », « j’sais », « ch’ais ») pour 79 occurrences de la forme négative correspondante [je ne sais pas/plus] (« je ne sais pas/plus », « je sais pas/plus », « j’sais pas/plus », « ch’ais pas/plus »). Si ces chiffres intriguent, trois éléments peuvent déjà être introduits à titre de facteurs explicatifs potentiels. Premièrement, les études consacrées à [je ne sais pas] montrent que l’expression ne se résume pas au fait de nier ou d’infirmier un état de connaissance (Pekarek Doehler, 2016). Il pourrait en aller de même avec la forme positive, qui ne constituerait donc pas systématiquement, ou seulement, une ressource de revendication d’un état de connaissance. Deuxièmement, le corpus fait apparaître une fréquence relative bien plus importante de la forme [on sait]. Il est dès lors envisageable que le caractère autocentré de [je sais], peut-être assimilé à un déficit de modestie et/ou de validité (VS « telle ou telle étude montre que »), soit évité au profit de l’usage de « on », dont la plasticité référentielle est bien documentée (p. ex. Jacquin, 2017; Jonasson, 2006; Rabatel, 2001). Troisièmement, et dans la continuité du point précédent, [je sais] se heurte au principe rhétorique voulant que l’*ethos* de compétence/connaissance consiste en un effet du discours, en un acte de monstration, et non en l’objet d’une auto-revendication explicite (Aristote, 1991; Eggs, 1999; Jacquin & Micheli, 2013). La présente contribution entend ainsi explorer plus attentivement et plus systématiquement la contribution de ces [je sais] à l’activité de débat et à l’argumentation. Il s’agira d’étudier les [je sais] — et les mouvements argumentatifs et

types d'arguments dans lesquels ils opèrent — aux niveaux énonciatif (modalité, hétérogénéité énonciative), interactionnel (dynamique séquentielle et négociative) et multimodal (conduites incarnées, telles que la direction du regard et les gestes éventuels). Plus généralement, la contribution sera l'occasion de présenter les premiers résultats d'une recherche venant de débiter et relevant d'une étude des positionnements épistémiques tels qu'ils participent à l'organisation de différentes activités argumentatives, dont les débats. La contribution s'inscrit donc dans le colloque en combinant deux thématiques: [1. Argumentation in spoken interaction] et [2. Semantics and argumentation].

Henrike Jansen & Maarten van Leeuwen – A linguistic account of presentational choice in *ad populum* argumentation

Leiden University, the Netherlands

An important characteristic of populist discourse is the referral to 'the will of the people', i.e. an appeal to the opinion of a lot of people in order to endorse one's own standpoint (*argumentum ad populum*). From a normative argumentative perspective, the question can be raised how such appeals should be assessed. Some authors say that it is a democratic principle that policy decisions are based on majority opinion. A survey of the scarce literature addressing the rationality of 'democratic' *ad populum* appeals indicates that they can be used legitimately indeed, but merely convey a weak type of argument.

If it is true that *ad populum* appeals in deliberation should be ascertained as weak arguments, we may expect that politicians do not use them in a 'blatant' form, but make use of stylistic choices ('presentational devices') to present these arguments in a disguised way. A systematic analysis of popularity appeals put forward by the Dutch populist politician Geert Wilders shows that he does indeed never draw the explicit inference that because a lot of people hold a certain opinion, this opinion should be developed into policy measures. Wilders can therefore not be held committed to such an inference, as he can always say that he did not mean that, and that he only wants to point out that a lot of people have a certain opinion. At the same time, though, his *ad populum* appeals do free-ride on the suggestion, evoked by conformity bias, that it is good to follow the will of the people. They can therefore be regarded as successful strategic manoeuvres.

In our paper, we will present an overview of the ways in which Wilders appeals to the will of the people. Our results show that Wilders makes use of various linguistic devices for both referring to the people and to their opinions. We will discuss which commitments a certain linguistic presentation entails for an arguer. In doing so, we do not only contribute to the pragma-dialectical study of presentational devices for strategic manoeuvring, but also to the theoretical part of the pragma-dialectical study of 'fallacies in disguise'.

K

Irene Kunert – Les verbes métaargumentatifs comme indicateurs argumentatifs dans les publications scientifiques françaises et allemandes

Universität Heidelberg, Germany

Les indicateurs argumentatifs constituent une classe de mots et expressions explicitant avec une certaine probabilité le caractère argumentatif d'un énoncé. La présente étude met l'accent sur l'utilisation de certains verbes qui peuvent marquer lexicalement la transition entre argument et conclusion: *prouver*, *démontrer* et *montrer* pour le français, *beweisen*, *belegen*, *nachweisen* et *zeigen* pour l'allemand. Un verbe comme *prouver* indique toujours qu'un locuteur est en train d'argumenter ou de parler d'une argumentation et peut donc être qualifié d'intrinsèquement métaargumentatif. En revanche, si la sémantique argumentative d'un verbe est une dérivation de son sens premier, ce verbe est secondairement métaargumentatif. Parmi les verbes étudiés, ceci est le cas pour *montrer* et *zeigen*, dont le sens premier 'faire voir' permet d'arriver au sens argumentatif 'ceci montre cela'.

L'étude vise à comparer la fréquence des verbes et les contextes de leur utilisation dans les publications scientifiques provenant de trois disciplines : linguistique, archéologie et psychologie. Le corpus contient 20 articles par langue et discipline.

Les analyses permettent de formuler deux tendances:

1. Dans les textes examinés, les constructions argumentatives avec *montrer* et *zeigen* ont plus d'occurrences que celles contenant un verbe intrinsèquement métaargumentatif.
2. Les verbes intrinsèquement métaargumentatifs forment un groupe hétérogène. Des verbes plus

spécifiques ont plus d'occurrences que des verbes plus généraux. Pour les articles français, cela veut dire que les exemples contenant *démontrer* ('établir la vérité de quelque chose d'une manière évidente et rigoureuse') sont plus nombreux que ceux contenant le verbe *prouver*. Dans les textes allemands, les verbes *belegen / nachweisen* ('prouver concrètement, par exemple par l'aide d'un document écrit') sont utilisés plus fréquemment que *beweisen*.

Dans les publications scientifiques analysées, les tendances de l'utilisation des verbes métaargumentatifs sont les mêmes en français et en allemand, ce qui n'est pourtant pas toujours le cas: Une étude précédente sur un corpus plus grand a révélé que dans le discours politique et journalistique, les verbes *prouver* et *démontrer* jouent un rôle plus important en français que *beweisen*, *belegen* et *nachweisen* en allemand.

L

Marcin Lewiński & Mehmet Ali Uzelgun - Indicators of practical argumentation in ecological reasoning

Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal

This paper investigates how arguers construct their practical arguments in actual discourse, using particular indicators of various elements of practical argument. As a theoretical and methodological basis, we use our previous work on practical argumentation (Author1, 2017; forth.) that elucidates in detail the complex structure of practical argument, derived from the discussions in argumentation theory (Atkinson, Bench-Capon, & McBurney, 2006; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Walton, 2007) and philosophy (Broome, 2013; Brun & Betz, 2016; Searle, 2001). According to the scheme, for a practical argument to start, there needs to be a gap between the (problematic) Circumstances (C) and envisaged Goals (G) – desired future states of affairs. These future states embody our main Values (V). In order to get from C to G we should take some Means or Measures (M).

The relevant literature in argumentation theory and philosophy typically focuses on the abstract features of practical inference under uncertainty. In this paper, we instead use the scheme to address concrete research questions regarding argumentative indicators: How are values expressed in discourse? How are goals stated, negotiated and adjusted? How are the means presented, e.g., as the necessary, satisfactory, or the best?

Our corpus comprises of recorded interviews with professionals engaged in the transition to a low-carbon society in a European Union country. These interviews are then transcribed and annotated in the Atlas.ti tool. The interviews focus on the ways these professionals practically reason about the transition: how they appeal to the basic values grounding their arguments, how they assert the immediate and long-term goals, and the possible options these goals can be reached with. In the analysis, we first reconstruct the complex practical arguments produced by the interviewees. Then, for the purposes of corpus annotation and drawing on the literature, we create sets of indicators for the elements of the scheme of practical arguments (e.g., evaluative expressions for the basic values, comparative and superlative structures for the means to be taken, modal expressions for the goals to be reached). This enables the study to sketch a map of argumentative indicators used by professionals in their practical arguments over a major societal problem involving high degrees of uncertainty. In the conclusion, we discuss the importance of these indicators both for gaining deeper insight into how ecological reasoning manifests itself and for a better understanding of the ways in which practical arguments are discursively constructed.

Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri – Implicatures and stereotypes: a persuasive synergy (FR/EN)

University of Roma Tre, Italy

We propose that implicatures and stereotypes reinforce each other in producing persuasive effects. Both categories' persuasive effectiveness has been studied quite in depth. For implicatures cf. for ex. Ducrot 1982, Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1986, Rigotti 1988, Sbisà 2007, and specifically concerning their working in texts with persuasive purposes Lombardi Vallauri 2009, 2016, Lombardi Vallauri - Masia 2014. For stereotypes, cf. Smith 1990, Browne 1998, Darke – Ritchie 2007, Zawiska – Cinnirella 2010, Sheehan 2014, Domaneschi-Penco 2016.

However, the way these two categories interact still deserves further account. This will be done, in the proposed communication, on the basis of first-hand data from advertising texts, where persuasion is surely a primary function.

Implicatures are more easily drawn if the content to be recovered is a stereotype, as compared to less expectable information. At the same time, stereotypes are more easily accepted and less probably challenged if they are presented implicitly, via implicature. By way of example, this can be seen in the following announcements from the 2006 national political campaign in Italy:



(1) The “no globals” in the government?
No, thanks



(2) Illegal immigrants
at will?
No, thanks

<i>statement (by the Right)</i>
we are against the “no globals” in the government
we are against illegal immigrants without regulation

Gricean path

“It makes no sense to mention this threat, if there is no danger that it comes true. Consequently,”

<i>implicature (drawn by the target)</i>
the Left will put the “no globals” in the government
the Left will accept illegal immigrants without regulation

Each announcement implicated an accusation to the Left:

Interestingly, the implicature is guided by a stereotypical concept of the Left:

- The Left takes sides with all “irregular people”: immigrants, no globals etc.

Here, the exploitation of stereotypes and implicatures has a twofold, *bidirectional* effect. The stereotypical assumptions guide the implicature process, and at the same time they are re-inforced by that process. If directly asserted, such stereotypes would appear as a too simplistic and exaggerate representation of reality (Sheehan 2014); but since they are only evoked implicitly during the inferential process, they get some chance to bypass the addressees’ critical reaction and to be transferred into their set of beliefs.

These facts are widely exploited in persuasive communication, especially when trying to *convince the target audience about things that are not true*. Consequently, awareness of them should be regarded as an important ingredient of democratic cohabitation.

Margherita Luciani – Double bind and its underlying argumentative foundations: a case study from a TV-news program

Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland

The present paper proposes an argumentative reading of the Batesonian concept of double bind (Bateson 1979). I assume that understanding the argumentative basis of double bind will help identify the conditions under which double bind can occur and its psychological implications. I examine the role of double bind in the non prototypical context of the newsroom, in particular at the newsroom-audience interface. In order to do that, I present a single case analysis of newsmaking, considering a TV news item in which two contradictory messages are conveyed. Furthermore, I conduct a semantic analysis of key terms that frame the news in contradictory ways.

The case study is based on the corpus of the project “Argumentation in newsmaking process and product”. This corpus consists of French and German data from the Swiss public service television (SRG SSR) which were collected during a previous project and a more recent dataset collected at Corriere del Ticino (CdT). The case study presented in this paper is based on Swiss German data.

The problem of double bind has been addressed in several domains, such as anthropology, clinical psychology, sociology and communication studies. These studies are mainly concerned with double bind's detrimental effects rather than with its underpinning reasoning processes. Thus, for instance, neither the premises that generate the contradiction nor the agency relationships at stake in the inferences are explicitly addressed. In what follows I will fill this gap by adopting an argumentative and a semantic analysis. Firstly, I will identify the contradictory messages put forth by the editorial board in the news item. If we think of arguments as 'invitations to inference' (Pinto 1996: 168), we can say that the audience uses the two contradictory messages as two different arguments from which two inferences to two implicit standpoints can be drawn. Secondly, in order to shed light on the implicit premises of the audience's contradictory inferences, I use Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010). Since an only argumentative analysis was not sufficient to grasp the agency relationships at stake in the double bind phenomenon, I conducted a careful semantic analysis on the crucial terms of the analysed inferences via Congruity theory (Rigotti and Rocci 2006). This allows to reach a full, explicit and analytical understanding of underlying argumentative foundations of double bind phenomena (theoretical aim) and to understand its effects on the news' framing and on the audience uptake (contextual aim).

M

Didier Maillat – The Argument and the Honey Pot: a pragmatic account of fallacies of seduction

University of Fribourg, Switzerland

In this paper I will look at the impact that seduction can have in an argumentative interaction. More specifically, I will consider seduction as a set of discursive strategies that try to manipulate the hearer's ability to evaluate the speaker's arguments within an argumentative exchange.

In the first part I will argue that a pragmatic approach to deceptive discourse grounded on a cognitivist and inferential model such as Relevance Theory (Wilson & Sperber 2012; Maillat & Oswald 2009, 2011; Maillat 2013, 2017) is best able to account for the disruptive effects affecting the interpretative processes of the hearer exposed to manipulative argumentative strategies. I will show that manipulation is an attempt to constrain the process of context selection in order to control the interpretation of the hearer.

In the second part, I will illustrate how this model can be successfully applied to explain how seductive strategies effectively attempt to control the hearer's interpretative processes. Thus, seduction strategies will be analysed as a set of constraints orchestrated by the speaker in order to control the hearer's ability to evaluate her arguments. I will proceed with a discussion of illustrative cases of fallacious arguments typically associated with seduction such as *false attribution*, *argument of authority*, and *ethos-based fallacies* (e.g. reversed *ad baculum*) and argue that what these strategies have in common is a propensity to rely on known pragmatic biases (Sperber's *guru* effect) and cognitive biases (Pohl 2004), such as the *attractiveness stereotype* or the *halo effect* (Salkind 2008), to effectively constrain the interpretative processes of the hearer and impose the seducer's standpoint.

Maurizio Manzin, Federico Puppo, Serena Tomasi – Style formulas and arguments in legal speeches

Università di Trento, Italy

The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of communication in forensic situations, drawing on expertise from forensic linguistics. Most crucially, the authors will divide the paper presentation into three sections:

1. An introductory part will serve to give a clear picture of the context of research and outline the features of legal language. The scientific language is based on common language, therefore has polysemy, vagueness and ambiguity. In legal use, terms and phrases borrowed from ordinary language may vary; all the transformations are "administered" by legal practitioners in a complex pragmatic process, dealing with an institutionalized and dialogical context.
2. Secondly, the authors will focus attention on the linguistic forensic practice of law, which is characterized by the frequent use of courtesy formulas, also called *style clauses*, and legal maxims, the s.c. *brocardi*.

Courtesy formulas are included in contract forms, defensive speeches and even in judgments. Doctrine and jurisprudence have mainly analysed the use of formulas used in contracts in order to limit parties' obligations; on the contrary, their use in forensic communication does not seem to be

of particular interest. The purpose of this paper will be to highlight the role played by courtesy formulas in forensic practice, whose use seems functional to the progressive construction of a common argumentative ground, to which the parties cooperate in the complex dynamic of practical judgment

At the same time, the analysis will propose a theoretical reconstruction of brocard terms, short and concise juridical maxims which correspond to general principles and behavioural norms. The corpus of judgments passed by Italian Supreme Court of Cassation offers many examples of Latin expressions used as technical terms.

3. In the last section, the authors claim the argumentative role of style clauses and brocardi. They could be analysed as explicit arguments and, also, as tricky “dressed” arguments. In this second sense, their use is not neutral but deceiving for what they do not say.

Sabrina Mazzali-Lurati, Chiara Pollaroli & Daniela Marcantonio – The rhetorical and argumentative relevance of ‘extreme consequence’ in advertising

Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland

Recent research conducted on creativity in advertising identified a taxonomy of recurrent patterns – called ‘creativity templates’ – that structure and organize the message of successful award-winning advertisements. The extreme consequence template is one of the most frequent ones. Advertisements employing this pattern represent the exaggerated positive or negative consequence of either using or not using the advertised product. This mechanism cannot but remind of the rhetorical trope of hyperbole.

Starting from the assumptions that (1) advertisements put forth premises by an integration of semiotic modes in order to support the claim that a product is worth buying, and (2) monomodal or multimodal rhetorical tropes can “epitomize” or activate lines of reasoning corresponding to argument schemes, we will investigate how advertising messages employing the ‘extreme consequence’ pattern frame the situation(s) depicted in the message and how this framing advances argument(s) in support of a standpoint.

Cases of both print and audiovisual advertising messages employing the pattern of ‘extreme consequences’ will be examined. We will first identify the mental spaces (i.e. situated activations of recognizable frames) that compose the message and the mechanism(s) of exaggeration connecting them (e.g., an exaggeration based on a quantitative continuum of connected items or stages of an event, an exaggeration based on the replacement of a species with another species of the same genus, an exaggeration based on the inversion of a framed situation, etc.). Then, an argumentative analysis will make explicit the standpoint(s) and the arguments advanced monomodally or multimodally. The exaggeration of the action or the result of using a product will be analyzed starting from the standpoint and observing whether the standpoint obtains an adequate support from the exaggeration allowing the spectator to infer the message.

In a further step, we will go deeply into the standpoint-argument relation in order to verify the inferential nature of the ‘extreme consequence’ pattern in the structure of the argument: does the pattern correspond to a specific locus or argument scheme? Does the pattern make the audience infer a factual premise and/or a culturally shared major premise? How does the pattern affect the audience and appeals to its values and knowledge of the world?

Johanna Miecznikowski-Fuenfschilling – At the juncture between evidentiality and argumentation: evidential verb complementation (EN/FR)

Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland

Evidentiality and argumentation are theoretical concepts that arose in largely separate research traditions, i.e. typological linguistics on one hand and discourse studies, in particular rhetoric and argumentation theory, on the other. Recent research has brought these traditions closer together, however. The present contribution builds on these recent works to clarify the relations between the two concepts within a pragmatic framework and, in a second step, applies the proposed definitions to a specific example, i.e. constructions with evidential verbs+source indicating complements.

Broadly speaking, the concepts of evidentiality and argumentation both refer to communicative means that support and justify assertive speech acts. Moreover, some relations, such as for example testimony based on direct experience, relying on the authority of others' discourses, or causal inference from perceivable results play a role in the categorization both of evidential means and of arguments. However, there are good reasons to draw distinctions. Evidential means and strategies operate on the preparatory condition of weak and strong assertive speech acts according to which the speaker must possess adequate knowledge. They signal the complete or incomplete fulfillment of this condition and specify the type of knowledge that the speaker possesses. They are

speaker-centered and, in rhetorical terms, signal a certain kind of *ethos*. Argumentation, on the other hand, aims at increasing the acceptability of assertive acts as standpoints by suggesting that the addressee may reasonably infer them from statements he or she has already accepted (i.e. arguments). It is hearer-oriented and operates at the level of *logos*.

In language use, it is not always straightforward to decide if a given structure has a primarily evidential or rather an argumentative function. Clear subjective deictic reference to the speaker's possessing or acquiring knowledge and a lack of overt argument-conclusion relations suggest evidential functions, whereas overt argument-conclusion relations and hearer-oriented deixis suggest argumentative functions. But there is often space for interpretation. To illustrate this analytical problem I will discuss a series of examples of constructions in Italian with cognitive and perceptive verbs such as *dare l'impressione* 'to give the impression' (x, p) or *evincersi da* 'to learn from' (p, x), taken from a corpus of written argumentative discourse in Italian that consists of opinion articles, reviews and online comments. These constructions evidentially categorize p as inferred, but leave the cognizing subject implicit, providing little deictic information. As far as argument-conclusion relations are concerned, they do not hold between independent propositions, but the verbs' x-arguments provide text segments that in some contexts may be interpreted as kernels of arguments.

Dima Mohammed & Pellegrino Cammino – De-politicisation, re-politicisation and disagreement: an argumentative view on legitimation strategies

Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal

In this paper, we examine de- and re-politicisation in political legitimation strategies. In line with the obligation to explain and justify the measures they take, politicians resort to various strategies. De-politicisation strategies were dominant during the Sovereign Debt crisis in the EU. Through de-politicisation, politicians in charge presented austerity as the only possibility rather than a political choice. Even though de-politicisation has been usually associated with right-wing market-oriented politics, the de-politicisation of austerity has been enacted by centre-left, centre-right and technical executives alike. Interestingly, analyses of post-crisis legitimation discourse show the emergence of a re-politicisation that places policy-making into the realm of political choice. That too did not follow consistent ideological differences. A different perspective on de- and re-politicisation seems necessary in order to understand what is at stake in the discourse of legitimation. As we will be showing in our analysis, the difference between de- and re-politicisation is essentially argumentative.

In this paper, we develop an argumentative view on de-politicisation and re-politicisation. The view is based on the understanding that acknowledging legitimate disagreement, which is at the core of argumentation, is also at the core of politicisation. By acting as if there is no legitimate disagreement about the question of what needs to be done, de-politicisation places the question outside the scope of collective argumentation. Conversely, re-politicisation reinstates the disagreement about what needs to be done and consequently brings the question (back) within the scope of collective argumentation. Starting from this view, we examine a corpus of speeches by prime ministers of Portugal and Spain, two countries hit by the crisis, and whose post-crisis governments come from opposite ideological leanings. The difference between de-politicisation and re-politicisation is seen in terms of the difference between explanation and argumentation: while in de-politicisation, disagreement is restricted and the reason-giving becomes an instance of explanation aimed at overcoming ignorance; in re-politicisation, the reason-giving is an instance of argumentation that acknowledges disagreement and aims to overcome it. In the analysis, the discursive articulation of disagreement will be investigated by identifying linguistic markers of the relevant argumentative functions.

In addition to a better understanding of how disagreement is articulated discursively, this paper offers interesting insights into how politics works. By taking language seriously, the study of legitimation strategies helps make politics more understandable, which can consequently empower ordinary citizens.

Misha-Laura Müller – Plausible deniability: when implicit contents bow down before the speaker's commitments (EN/FR)

University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland

This paper tackles the relationship between implicit communication and plausible deniability, as presented in Pinker, Nowak and Lee (2008) and Reboul (2011, 2017). In these papers, it is argued that implicit communication is an ideal tool for manipulative argumentation, because it allows speakers to plausibly deny a content or a manipulative intention. These approaches essentially rest

upon a Gricean view of language (cf. Grice 1975), where the speaker is only committed to the truth of what is said and not to what is implied. We argue that the criterion of implicitness is not sufficient to allow for plausible deniability. An obvious example would be the one of Donald Trump's official speech – during the 2016 presidential campaign – in which he conveyed the implicature that “second Amendment people (i.e. gun owners) should commit violent acts against Hilary Clinton to prevent her from being elected”. In fact, the implicature was so strongly conveyed that he was called on to apologize by all political parties (cf. Corasaniti & Haberman 2016). We follow Saussure & Oswald (2009), in arguing that, while interpreting utterances, listeners attribute commitments to the speaker in accordance with the principle of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95). The more relevant a communicated content in the circumstances, the more committed a speaker will be to implicit contents, and the less likely he will be able to deny it. The notion of speaker commitment will bring us to a more moderate view, where implicit communication can be manipulative, but under specific conditions which have to do with the listener's vigilance (Sperber et al. 2010) towards the speaker. In this paper, we focus on the problem of implicatures and show to what extent the denial of such contents can lead to a ‘pragmatic inconsistency’ (Saussure & Oswald 2009). Furthermore, we suggest that “emotional effects” (Wharton 2016, 2017) are relevant for the listener's assessment of plausible deniability. In this respect, we present the discursive marker “well” as an ‘expressive meaning’ that strongly affects the speaker's ability to deny the following content.

O

Tomonori Okubo – Semantic bias in negation and its effects on certain types of rhetorical discourses (FR/EN)

Kansai University, Japan

This paper aims at elucidating semantic bias observable in a certain type of negation and its effect on such rhetorical discourses as hyperbole, irony and litotes, within the frameworks of the Argumentative Polyphony Theory and of the Semantic Blocs Theory (Carel, 2011).

Ducrot (1973) indicated that there is a semantic bias in certain couples of antonymic terms put in negation. For example, while the negation of *clean: not clean* is very near to *dirty, not dirty* is far from equivalent to *clean* (see also Bolinger (1972)). We argued (in our previous works) that this phenomenon is not observable in all antonymic couples but only in negation of lexically favourable terms, that is, it is not the case for contextually favourable terms. For instance, the pair *big/small* is not intrinsically, but can only be contextually normative predicates (“My house is *big*: there is enough space”), and *not big* is not necessarily considered to be quasi-equivalent to *small* (“My house is *not big*, but *not small* either”).

This kind of semantic bias can be exploited in some rhetorical discourses. Firstly, while it is a phenomenon observable only in lexically favourable terms, one can apply this rule forcibly to terms that are not lexically normative. For instance, the pair *white/black* as terms for racial classification, is considered to be lexically normative with *white* as favourable, allowing *not white* as equivalent to *black* (“Obama as the First Black President”), so that discourses including this expression can be hyperbolically dogmatic.

Secondly, this semantic bias affects what Wilson (2014) calls “normative bias” observable in (antiphrastic) irony: “the most common use of irony is to criticise or complain when a situation [...] does not live up to some norm-based expectation. Only in special circumstances can irony be used to praise or reassure [...]” We will show that this bias is derived, not from certain pragmatic conditions as Wilson indicates, but is more deep-rooted in semantics of language argumentatively described.

Thirdly, the semantic bias in lexically normative terms has influence also on another rhetorical figure: litotes. This figure, when expressed by a negative utterance (“It is not a stupid idea!” to say it is excellent), contrary to normative bias observed in antiphrastic irony, has tendency to be more praiseful than critical.

For all these problematics that are ordinarily explained from pragmatic point of view, this paper tries to describe them persuasively by means of semantic argumentative framework.

P

Manuel Padilla Cruz – On the Evidential Function of Some Participial Adjectives: A Procedural Analysis

University of Seville, Spain

Carston (2016) differentiates four stages in the relevance-theoretic contributions on procedural meaning. Stage I addressed discourse connectives, which guide comprehension by instructing how the propositional contents that they connect must be related in order to derive implicatures (Blakemore 1987, 2002). Stage II, on the one hand, analysed linguistic expressions constraining the construction of higher-level explicatures and evidentials indicating the speaker's certainty about the proposition expressed, which are not well integrated into the syntax of utterances (Ifantidou 1993a, 1993b, 2001). On the other hand, Stage II extended procedural analyses to linguistic devices that are fully integrated into the syntax of utterances, such as pronouns, mood indicators, tense, aspect or modal verbs, which facilitate determination of the proposition expressed (Wilson and Sperber 1993; Escandell Vidal et al. 2011). Stage III proposed a procedural analysis of interjections, expletives, prosody and paralanguage (Wilson and Wharton 2006; Wharton 2009, 2016; Blakemore 2011, 2015). Finally, Stage IV suggests that words encoding concepts would trigger a process of ad hoc concept construction (Wilson 2011; Carston 2016).

This presentation will focus on a group of *participial adjectives* occurring in adnominal position (Geenbaum and Quirk 1993; Huddleston 1993), which, as opposed to prototypical adjectives, do not provide information about the properties or states of the head they seem to modify. Participles like 'alleged', 'suspected' or 'supposed' will be considered procedural markers indicating the communicator's epistemic stance towards the information communicated, so they function as evidentials and are amenable to a procedural analysis along the lines of analyses in Stage II. Moreover, such participial adjectives will be claimed to assist *epistemic vigilance* mechanisms in their decisions about the credibility and reliability of both communicators and the information dispensed (Mascaro and Sperber 2009; Sperber et al. 2010) by enacting or raising the activation of these mechanisms (Wilson 2012).

Fabio Paglieri – Invented examples, exemplary texts, and muddy arguments: where should we look, and why?

ISTC-CNR, Italy

This paper discusses three types of texts that argumentation theorists often analyze: artificially invented examples, exemplary instances of argumentative discourse, and naturally occurring interactions among speakers that might or might not be argumentative in nature, yet are thought to incorporate at least some relevant argumentation (henceforth, "muddy arguments"). This taxonomy of textual materials is neither exhaustive nor unique. It is, however, representative of most texts used for argument analysis, and it helps highlighting the different opportunities, challenges, and limitations that each textual type poses. While it is well acknowledged that different theories may be best suited to analyze different types of text, here we look at the opposite direction of influence, i.e. *how a certain type of textual material may warp theoretical intuitions*. This may happen deliberately or unconsciously, and may have either positive, negative, or mixed effects: an important aim of this paper is to help theorists (i) becoming aware of how the texts they analyze affect their own theory, and (ii) learning how to maximize the benefits and minimize the dangers of such textual influence. In particular, I will argue that:

- artificially invented examples should be relegated to cursory appearances at the early stages of argumentation and critical thinking education, and then abandoned in favor of more complex and realistic types of argumentative text;
- among realistic texts, both exemplary arguments and muddy arguments have important roles to play. Exemplary arguments afford detailed analysis of sophisticated argumentative strategies and structures, offer case-specific qualitative data, and provide a regulative ideal that may inspire improvement of argumentative practices; yet they also present an unrealistic view of how people are supposed to argue, let alone how they actually argue. In contrast, muddy arguments offer an accurate snapshot of argumentative reality, encourage critical reflection on everyday practices, and produce large-scale quantitative data, at the cost of adopting extremely simplified models of argumentative discourse and broadening too much the definition of what an argument is.

I will conclude showing how some of these text-dependent biases can be neutralized, e.g. avoiding to see arguments where there is none (*argumentative delirium*), while others are unavoidable and should simply be made explicit. I will also insist that exemplary texts and muddy arguments are

complementary tools for teaching argumentation and critical thinking: a sound preparation to argue requires both shining ideals and reality checks.

Annick Angelina Paternoster – Emotive rhetorical figures as indicators of controversial topics in Italian 19th-century conduct and etiquette books

Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland

Nineteenth-century Italy is literally inundated with conduct manuals, the so-called *galateï*, and etiquette books. Luisa Tasca (2004) counts 186 original titles, resulting in at least 450 different editions, a true boom that can probably be explained by the fact that the emerging bourgeoisie is looking for a new code of conduct. The *Corpus di galateï italiani ottocenteschi*, contains the 50 most popular conduct and etiquette books printed in Italy in the so-called long 19th century (1800--1920). Numbers of conduct books peak in the decennia following the Unification of the country. This paper works with the 20 most successful (that is, the most reprinted) conduct books published between 1860--1900: these works represent the Italian government's endeavour to rally school going children and adolescents, together with members of the working class, around the official values of the time: love God, your country, your family, your work.

This corpus of educational treatises contains numerous features of embedded orality. Moreover, there are extensive clusters of rhetorical figures that foreground the appeal to the reader: interjections, allocutions, apostrophes, rhetorical questions, mock dialogue, exclamations, reticence, time-switch and deictic immediacy. With the support of classical rhetoric — see the compendium by Heinrich Lausberg (1998 [1960], who classifies these figures as “emotive figures” (§§ 808--851) and “figures oriented towards the audience” (§§ 758--779)

— and rhetorical approaches to argumentation — Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2008 [1958]) who include these as “figures de communion” (p. 232) —, I will argue that when these features of immediacy appear together in clusters, they work in an emotive direction of involvement: these figures do not just want to catch the reader's attention, they aim to achieve an increased commitment in regards to topics where consensus is **not** taken for granted. Clusters of these rhetorical figures are seen as indicators of controversial themes and can help establish a catalogue of the social transgressions that need uprooting: alcoholism, gambling, strikes, to name but a few. Through manual annotation with UAM Corpus Tools (O'Donnell 2008) the paper aims to link specific rhetorical figures to the presence of controversial topics.

Roosmaryn Pilgram – The effect of metaphors on the perceived reasonableness of argumentation

University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands & Leiden University, the Netherlands

When asked what would be the first thing to happen if he was in power, Dutch right-wing politician Geert Wilders responded that he would close down the borders, because “the tsunami of Islamisation has to stop” (my translation, *de Volkskrant*, 2006). By means of this water metaphor, Wilders vividly implies that vast numbers of Islamic migrants are currently entering the Netherlands, resulting in a catastrophe.

Wilders's use of metaphor illustrates its rhetorical potential: metaphor can highlight (or hide, as the case may be) particular aspects of the argumentation that may make the standpoint at issue seem more (or less) reasonable. However, the extent to which metaphors do this has not fully been determined. Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2013) claim to have experimentally shown that metaphors in natural language substantially influence our reasoning, while Steen, Reijnierse & Burgers (2014) question Thibodeau and Boroditsky's results. In their article, Steen, Reijnierse & Burgers nevertheless point out “The fact that our results do not correspond with the results of Thibodeau and Boroditsky suggests the need for establishing more precise boundary conditions under which metaphors do or do not impact reasoning”. This paper is aimed at establishing such boundary conditions.

Experimental research was conducted on metaphors used as a premise in the argumentation (“You should not stop exercising when starting a diet, because you shouldn't turn the heater up with all the windows open either”). By means of questionnaires, native English speakers were asked to evaluate the reasonableness of sound and fallacious arguments in which metaphors were used, in hypothetical dialogue fragments (cf. Van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels, 2009). Only novel metaphors were included in the argumentation to prompt respondents to perceive the metaphors as metaphors. A repeated measurement design in combination with a multiple message design was used to generate a generalizable set of deliberate metaphors.

The experimental results show how the use of deliberate metaphor in argumentation influences sound and fallacious arguments; the results establish more precise boundary conditions under

which metaphors impact the perceived reasonableness of argumentative discourse. Consequently, this research can be seen as a fundamental step in systematically determining the effects of metaphors in argumentation.

R

Kiki Renardel de Lavalette, Gerard Steen & Corina Andone – Countering figurative analogies in British Public Bill Committee debates

University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

This paper studies argumentation in British Public Bill Committee debates by focusing on the way in which figurative analogies are countered by means of argumentation. In these legislative debates, in which prescriptive standpoints for a course of action are commonly advanced, legislators sometimes frame their arguments in metaphorical terms. These so-called figurative analogies can mislead legislators into taking wrong decisions with regard to the acceptability of a bill by oversimplifying the issue under discussion. This suggests that resisting figurative analogies by putting forward argumentation aimed at countering them is a crucial and necessary skill for legislators in order to come to a well-informed decision about the acceptability of the proposed legislation.

It is the goal of this paper to explore the phenomenon of countering figurative analogies in authentic legislative debates, and to show that resistance to figurative analogies is a complex phenomenon comprising various types of criticisms to different types of metaphor. To this end, we analyse case studies of resistance to figurative analogies found in the British Public Bill Committee debates on the Education Bill 2010-11 by making use of the three-dimensional model of metaphor (Steen, 2011a) and the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (Van Eemeren, 2010). These two theories provide diverging, yet complementary and compatible perspectives on the phenomenon of resistance to metaphor; the metaphor theory allows for studying the linguistic, conceptual and communicative properties of the metaphors that are employed argumentatively in figurative analogies, and argumentation theory enables analysing the argumentative properties of the figurative analogies and the resistance against them. The innovative combination of a metaphor theory and an argumentative theory as proposed here is particularly well suited for the purpose of this study, because it permits approaching metaphor and argumentation from a comparable view of discourse events as genres (Steen, 2011b) or argumentative activity types (Van Eemeren, 2010).

Andrea Rocci, Sara Greco, Rebecca Schär, Joséphine Convertini, Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, & Antonio Iannaccone – The significance of the adversative connectives *aber*, *mais*, *ma* ('but') as indicators in young children's argumentation.

Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland & Université de Neuchâtel, Switzerland

The study is part of a research seeking to understand in which situations young children engage in argumentation and how their contributions are structured from an inferential and a dialectical point of view. Particular care is devoted to the reconstruction of the implicit aspects of the inferential configuration of arguments to assess to what extent adult understanding of children's reasoning may be affected by difficulties in recovering its implicit parts. Two corpora have been collected for the project: (1) everyday family conversations, (2) activities inspired by Piagetian tasks conducted in a kindergarten setting. Both are multilingual. In this context, we look at the adversative connectives Ger. *aber*, Fr. *mais*, It. *ma* ('but') as argumentative indicators (van Eemeren et al. 2007) helping the identification argumentative episodes and guiding the reconstruction of inferential configurations. While adversatives' role as argumentative indicators can easily escape untrained analysts, there is a well-established argumentative semantic analysis of these connectives (Ducrot 1980, Moeschler 1989, Winterstein 2012) outlining their functioning in teasing out implicit aspects of an argument. Adversatives have been considered the last step in the acquisitional sequence of connectives (Spooren and Sanders 2008). Peterson (1986) records a rich variety of uses of *but* in very young children, but does not interpret them in argumentative terms, while studies on the use of adversatives in arguments often focus on older children and written language, sometimes emphasizing their late and arduous acquisition (Akiguet and Piolat 1996). Following (Winterstein 2012), we assume that the argumentative analysis is the most adequate to capture the adult semantics of *but*-like adversatives and we *avoid* assuming any semantic deficit in children's use. We apply the argumentative semantics to the in-depth reconstruction of the implicit facet of children's argumentation in a collection of cases from the two corpora. It results that the model is applicable and that the reconstruction results in plausible confrontations and sophisticated

inferential configurations involving both rebutters and undercutters (Pollock 1987) targeting implicit or explicit standpoints. Dialectically, 'but'-adversatives signal *mixed* discussions (van Eemeren et al. 1992: 17), where both interlocutors express a standpoint. Thus, the analysis allows to identify situations in which the child puts forward a standpoint opposing the standpoint of another child or an adult. This excludes situations where children's argumentative behavior could be explained away as superficial conformity to the adult's expectations.

S

Paraskevi Sachinidou – Schemata of logic into processes of language. Types of processes as linguistic inscriptions of argumentation schemes

Democritus University of Thrace, Greece

Argumentation schemes design the routes, the paths, the directions, underpinning semantic relations with logical rules of inference for justifying/ supporting an idea, an argument, a standpoint (Macagno, 2015: 193). While designing these frames one has to also design what linguistic devices he/she can use, thus involving argumentation with language. In language testing and in tasks assessing argumentation writing, students are often faced with dilemmas and decisions as to how their opinions and standpoints can be linguistically deployed, and with what argumentation schemes. In choosing argumentation schemes they also choose their linguistic inscription, a step towards the construction of argumentation schemes and argumentation. There has been a wealth of research on argumentation schemes as logical heuristic forms of inference between premises and conclusion (Garssen, 2001; Hitchcock & Wagemans, 2011; Macagno, 2015; Macagno & Walton, 2015; Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008) as well as an ongoing and quite promising series of research on their linguistic construction (Henkemans & van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2007; Cabrio & Tonelli and Villata, 2013). In this paper using the theoretical framework deployed by Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and appraisal theory (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; Martin & White, 2005), I focus on one category of transitivity system, the types of processes and explore their correlation to certain types of argumentation schemes within students' argumentative writing in secondary education at their final year language assessment test. Process types as tools for the linguistic analysis of argumentation schemes were chosen due to their central role in reflecting the ways reality is perceived through linguistic and interpretive processes, and due to their core role in the ways flow of events either internal or external is designed and inscribed in language communication (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 213). Thus, process types linguistically interlink the necessary pragmatic and semantic nodes in forming meaning making procedural patterns within argumentation schemes. In that sense, process types linguistically realize representational schemata of reality into argumentation schemes focusing on the material, linguistic relations between premises and conclusion and on the purpose of their inference. After analysis and coding of argumentation schemes and process types in 46 students' texts, written in their final year language tests, statistical correlation analysis between process types and argumentation schemes revealed that in choosing argumentation schemes, students also choose the types of processes to embed them into, directing us to a linguistic priming of certain process types into certain types of argumentation schemes within the context of language testing. Consequently, this kind of choice reflects teaching directions of argumentation, students' content knowledge, genre, context and reality perceptions, as well as students' linguistic and sociocultural potential.

Juliane Schröter – Political Argumentation in the “Erläuterungen des Bundesrates” / “Explications du Conseil fédéral” / “Spiegazioni del Consiglio federale” / “Explicaziuns dal cussegl federal”

ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Switzerland

As the 'model country of direct democracy', Switzerland offers particularly rich and interesting empirical data for the study of political argumentation. Surprisingly though, there are only few studies of political argumentation in Switzerland with a background in linguistics, argumentation theory or rhetoric.

In my presentation, I will first briefly introduce a larger SNSF research project “Political argumentation in Switzerland” (2018-2021), which attempts to remedy the obvious lack of research. The linguistic project investigates the practices and norms of political argumentation in the context of Swiss popular votes.

In the main part of the paper, I will present a first study from the project – an analysis of the argumentation in a series of the so-called “Erläuterungen des Bundesrates”/“Explications du

Conseil fédéral”/“Spiegazioni del Consiglio federale”/“Explicaziuns dal cussegl federal” (for an example cf. Federal Chancellery (ed.) 2017). This official brochure is sent to all potential voters before a popular vote, and it is one of the most important information sources for the voters (cf. e.g. Lutz/Lebert/Kübler et al. 2017).

In the brochure, both the Federal Council and the committees which have launched the respective popular initiative or referendum present their most important arguments. What are the main similarities and differences between the argumentation of the Federal Council and the argumentation of the committees? The comparison draws on categories from politolinguistics as well as from different strands of argumentation theory (cf. e.g. Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958/1969/1971, Kienpointner 1992, Wengeler 2003, Eemeren/Grootendorst 2004). Particular attention will be given to words with a strong evaluative and deontic meaning (following Hermanns 1995/2012).

Focusing on empirical data which have received very little linguistic attention so far (for rare exceptions cf. Haltmeier 2010, Bonhomme 2013, Rossari 2013), the study is intended both as a contribution to the analysis of the relation between semantics and argumentation and as one step on the way towards a profound linguistic understanding of the specific forms and functions of political argumentation in Switzerland.

Jennifer Schumann, Steve Oswald & Sandrine Zufferey – What makes a Straw Man efficient? Three experiments assessing cognitive and linguistic factors (EN/FR)

University of Bern, Switzerland

This paper presents an experimental investigation of the effectiveness of the straw man fallacy, which we broadly define, following Oswald & Lewiński, as a “misrepresentation of someone’s position in order to easily refute that position” (2014: 313). In order to assess the role of the linguistic and cognitive factors playing a role in the effectiveness of this particular fallacy, which succeeds when the audience is unable to detect it, we designed a series of three studies meant to test whether the effectiveness of the fallacy (i) is affected by the *locus* of the fallacious item (standpoint vs. argument), (ii) is influenced by linguistic indicators which could make the fallacious item more or less easily detected, and (iii) is sensitive to implicit vs. explicit misrepresentations. This is therefore a contribution falling within axes 3 and 5 of the call for papers (i.e., ‘argumentative indicators’ and ‘rhetorical devices’ respectively).

The experimental design we use involves short dialogues containing either fallacious or nonfallacious elements. In each study, 30 participants read 40 items (20 fallacious and 20 nonfallacious) using different versions of the same sentences in all conditions, and responded to 4 questions relative to the agreement with each item on a 7 point Likert scale.

In the first experiment, we hypothesize that a misrepresented standpoint is less easily detectable than a misrepresented argument, as it is usually linguistically less salient. In the second experiment, we assess the importance of linguistic indicators, more specifically discourse connectives. We test whether the fallacious argument is more frequently detected when the fallacious part is introduced by the French connective “puisque”, a causal connective with an echoic meaning, or when the two segments are simply juxtaposed without any linguistic marker. We expect a lower acceptability rate when the fallacious segment is introduced by the connective, as we suspect the latter to increase the salience of the straw man by raising attention to the presence of attributed content. In the third experiment, we test if there is a difference between misrepresentations bearing on explicit or implicit arguments, hypothesizing that implicit distortions are more likely to be accepted by an audience because explicit arguments are more easily recoverable, and therefore they more readily accessible to be compared to the original. Taken together, these three experiments refine our understanding of the factors making a straw man fallacy efficient.

Lucia Scipione, Roberta Cardarello & Annamaria Contini – Argumentation in Primary School: an exploratory study of children spoken Interaction (EN/FR)

University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy

The study detects and analyzes argumentative features in spoken interaction at school during philosophical discussion among children (age range, 8-10). This study has a double focus: 1) to find a framework to analyze childrens' argumentation and at the same time to highlight methodological questions for the study of argumentative patterns in spoken interaction among children; 2) to show how “philosophy” can lead children to engage in argumentative discussions. The aim of this study is to outline pedagogical implications for educational practices based on the use of discussion. The research design uses a corpus of 6 video-recorded class sessions of 6

different approaches to Philosophy for and with children in 6 Italian primary classes with a non-participant observer. Nowadays is a need improve argumentative skills, as stated in many national curriculum guidelines. However, there seems to be no agreement on defining argumentation and on the nature of argumentative skills and its components, and there seems also to be no consensus on teaching and learning implication (arguing to learn approach vs learning to argue approach). To address these epistemological and methodological problems, the study combines the theoretical framework (supported by the socio-constructivist approach and by argumentation theories mostly applied on the field of education) with an analytic observation of collected empirical data. From the definition of argument as a verbal and social practice, the dialogical moves are isolated and basic argumentative features analyzed. The difficulty in choosing a coding scheme is discussed, given the difficulty of defining argumentation, and the type of interaction and the competence of the children in that age. Despite this, it is possible to identify essential elements such as explaining, justifying and hypothesizing, through the use of reasons to support one's own position. Particular attention will be given to the description of the types of reasons adopted in each setting of discussion and in each dialogical move. In the second part of the paper the context of philosophical discussion is analyzed through the identification of patterns of peer-to-peer interaction and teacher-peer interaction linked, when present, to collaborative argumentation. The study concludes with considerations regarding how children could be engaged in productive discussion in primary school to improve argumentative skills.

Takeshi Suzuki – Cinema Criticism as Argument: Its Value, Method, and Contribution

Meiji University, Japan & Cambridge University, England

From the perspective of argumentation pedagogy, there are a number of reasons why we study cinema criticism. Actually, "criticism is the attempt to discover and interpret the meaning and intentions of the film or filmmaker that extend beyond a film's surface features" (Prince, 2010). We, for example, can examine means of production, representation, ad hoc groups who assemble practice, ideological values that are promoted, and how narratives catch up social groups and reflect on style. Unfortunately, cinema is often viewed merely as an entertainment, and it has not been treated as one of important fields of study by the past argumentation scholars. Although cultural studies scholars have shown their fascination toward cinema, their focus of analysis is often to contextual. I believe that we need a more text-focus approach to its study. Therefore, this paper will explore rhetorical dimension of cinema: namely, the art of rhetoric as *techné* – or craft of making thoughts into expression, *praxis* – a communication habit or skill that people acquire through imitation, and a search for *Kairos*, or timing, how right words get noticed. There are three general steps to follow for writing a cinema criticism: Establish a critical methodology or interpretive framework, apply the methodology, and draw interpretive conclusions. Specifically, in this paper, how critical methodologies, such as psychoanalysis, can be provide critical insights and interpretations of particular cinemas will be discussed. This form of art, in fact, provides a space for seeing ourselves and puts into stylish perspective who we-are-not but who we-may-yet-become; it is both safe and provocative. Fiction carries with it distinction from reality; and it creates an alternative world where our thinking can be dramatized as a time outside ourselves.

V

Emma van Bijnen – Presupposing Starting Points in Conflict Mediation: How and Why Mediators Use Presuppositions to Broaden the Agreement Space

Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland

Presuppositions may play a constructive role in conflict mediation (i.e. van Eemeren 1993; Greco 2003; 2011). In mediation, the neutral third party is a communication designer (i.e. Aakhus 2007; Vasilyeva 2015) who attempts to design a context with enough common ground for a reasonable discussion between the disputing parties to take place. Focussing on how mediators broaden the agreement space, the general research question addressed in this paper is: what strategic function(s) could presupposing have for the (re-)establishment of common starting points in dispute mediation? In particular, this paper looks at possible strategic motivations for presupposing common starting points instead of presenting them as (main) propositions in interventions, and how the interventions are presented in the mediation session. I argue that mediators are unable to establish (new) material starting points directly since doing so could damage their neutrality position. In addition, I show that material as well as procedural starting points are presupposed by mediators in certain identifiable interventions that have specific communicative and/or interactional goals. Finally, I present the idea that mediators presuppose in order to re-establish common starting

points, which is a strategy with a goal that is different from the mediator strategy of establishing new common starting points.

I employ tools and concepts from argumentation theory, such as the definitions of material and procedural starting points in the pragma-dialectical approach (i.e. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). Argumentation theory forms a basis for the qualitative discourse analyses of a corpus of best practice mediation simulations that have been recorded, transcribed and translated. The linguistic notion of presupposition (accommodation), and in particular pragmatic presuppositions (Stalnaker 1977), is used to further analyse the function of the presuppositions in the excerpts. By combining insights from argumentation theory and linguistics we are able to shed new light on the important function of presuppositions in mediation. The results of the analyses will be presented by means of demonstrative examples.

W

Dunja Wackers – Resistance to violence-related metaphors for cancer analysed from an argumentation theoretical perspective

University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Following the cognitive revolution in metaphor research, over the past decades a myriad of studies has pointed out the ubiquity and importance of metaphor in language, thought, and more recently, communication (e.g. Steen 2008). Mapping characteristics of one domain onto another, metaphor has been shown to fulfil different basic and fundamental functions in the ways we reflect on aspects of our lives and the ways in which we express ourselves in communicating with one another (e.g. Deignan et al. 2013). What has been neglected in this context, however, is the fact that sometimes metaphors are also resisted -- not only in academic research that addresses negative impacts or otherwise undesirable aspects of the use of a particular metaphor, but also in public discourse, by language users themselves. This raises questions as to when and how people resist metaphor, and why.

The present paper provides a characterisation of resistance to violence-related metaphors for cancer from an argumentation theoretical point of view. Insights from the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation are used to explain what forms resistance to violence-related metaphors for cancer may take and how the elicitation of this resistance can be explained in relation to different aspects of the contested metaphors. In this paper it first will be discussed how two models of violence-related metaphors may be distinguished for developing a better understanding of their potential to elicit resistance. In a number of case studies it will be shown for both models how two types of arguments that are frequently provided in support of resistance correspond to (different aspects of) two specific argumentation schemes, i.e. the schemes of argumentation by (figurative) analogy and (negative) pragmatic argumentation. The exact relation of resistance to these schemes will be explained with reference to the focus of the resistance, which in the examples that will be discussed lies either on the metaphor itself or on real-life (detrimental) effects that may be caused by people using the metaphor in question in relation to cancer. Lastly, it will be argued that differences among individual cases of resistance belonging to either of the two models can be found in references to elements in the target domain that are specifically controversial or notorious in the light of the target domain situation.

Jean Wagemans – Propositions of policy and types of argument

University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

The *Periodic Table of Arguments* is a classification of argument that integrates the existing dialectical and rhetorical accounts into a systematic and comprehensive whole. The table is constructed by taking a factorial approach to argument classification and its theoretical framework consists of three independent characterizations of argument, namely (1) as subject or predicate argument; (2) as first-order or second-order argument; and (3) as instantiating one of nine combinations of types of propositions.

One of the challenges raised by commentators of the *Periodic Table of Arguments* concerns the reconstruction of propositions of policy. The present version of the table is premised on the idea that such propositions consist of a subject and a predicate, the former being a specific act (course of action, policy) and the latter being that it "should be carried out". Apart from these two elements, however, propositions of policy may also include as their constituents an actor, an object of the act, and a temporal indication. An example in which all of these constituents are present is 'The region of Ticino should legalize soft drugs in 2020'. Given that the theoretical framework of the table does

not allow for n-ary predicates, the identification of the type of argument supporting a proposition of policy depends on the choice of which elements are reconstructed as the subject and predicate terms of such propositions, thereby endangering the fulfillment of the requirement of mutual exclusiveness of the types of arguments distinguished in the table.

In this paper, this challenge will be taken up by determining the consequences of the various ways of reconstructing propositions of policy for the identification of the type of argument. The paper is structured in the following way. First, there will be a short exposition of the theoretical framework *Periodic Table of Arguments*. It will be explained how the table is constructed and which arguments are distinguished. Then, it will be explored in which different ways the subject and predicate terms of a proposition of policy can be reconstructed and how this poses a challenge to the identification of the types of argument involved. Finally, it will be analyzed how each of these different reconstructions is related to the theoretical framework of the *Periodic Table of Arguments*, what types of arguments are involved, and how mutual exclusiveness of the types of argument distinguished in the table can be preserved.

Z

Marta Zampa –“Our country needs a truly great leader, and we need a truly great leader now”: On Argumentative Framing, Epithets and Keywords in Trump’s Presidential Campaign

ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Switzerland

“The age of social media resembles the pre-literate, oral world” and “complicated, nuance thoughts that require context don’t play very well on most social platforms, but a resonant hashtag can have extraordinary influence”, observes Joe Weisenthal on Bloomberg (November 29, 2016), commenting Donald Trump’s communicative behavior. Indeed, the 45th president of the United States seems to master pre-literate communication: he uses a limited and simple vocabulary, regularly combines concepts with evaluations, exploits repetition, abundantly appeals to emotions, and masters Twitter. In his presidential campaign, Trump proposed a narrative in line with the strict father model typically embraced by Republicans (Lakoff, 2004). He depicted himself as the savior who will restore the lost greatness of the United States, a country whose glorious fate has long been neglected by politicians and that needs a hero from outside politics to take command.

In this paper, I consider how Trump frames socio-political issues within this heroic narrative and how he exploits them argumentatively. To this aim, I analyze the three speeches where Trump announced his candidacy (June 16, 2015), accepted the presidential nomination (July 21, 2016) and made a proposal for the first 100 days in office (October 22, 2016). In particular, I focus on two elements at the rhetorical and semantic level of Trump’s speeches: epithets and cultural keywords. Epithets are attributes or appositions that characterize an entity in a stereotypical fashion (Corazza, 2005; Croom, 2013), and thus crystalize the framing of this entity. The repeated use of epithets strengthens and propagates the crystalized framing of actors and topics in public discourse. Cultural keywords, i.e., culture-dependent frame-activating words (Rigotti & Rocci, 2005; Rocci & Wariss Monteiro, 2009), trigger unexpressed premises by functioning as *termini medi* in enthymematic reasoning, thus leading the audience to a conclusion favorable to the arguer. Methodologically, I embrace Greco Morasso’s (2012) approach to argumentative contextual frames, based on strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren, 2010) and frame analysis (Goffman (Entman, 1993; Entman, Matthes, & Pellicano, 2009; Fillmore, 1982; Goffman, 1975; Lakoff, 2004, 2009).



PANEL

Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri (*University of Roma Tre*), Viviana Masia (*University of Roma Tre*), Laura Baranzini (*University of Turin*), Doriana Cimmino (*University of Basel*), Federica Cominetti (*University of Florence*), Claudia Coppola (*University of Roma Tre*), Giorgia Mannaioli (*Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna*)

Qualitative and quantitative approaches to implicit communication

The literature in philosophy and linguistics has shed light on a number of communicative devices aimed at leaving part of a sentence's meaning not fully expressed (Frege, 1892; Ducrot, 1972; Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1986; Rigotti, 1988; Sbisà, 2007; Lombardi Vallauri, 2009; Domaneschi & Penco, 2016). Furthermore, it is well known that implicit communication is an effective means of persuasion (Sbisà, 2007; Lombardi Vallauri, 2009; De Saussure, 2013). Contemporary pragmatic views (Lombardi Vallauri 2016; Lombardi Vallauri & Masia, 2016, among others) have characterized presuppositions and implicatures, but also topicalizations, figurative language and semantic/syntactic vagueness as means for under-encoding meanings in a message. Research on corpus-based pragmatics (Lombardi Vallauri & Masia, 2014; Brocca et al. 2016) has sought to quantify the impact of the above-mentioned discourse phenomena on the processes by which addressees compute the meanings of utterances and texts. These quantitative approaches have proved suitable for measuring and comparing the impact of implicit communication in texts belonging to different genres and targeted at different types of audiences, although political discourses epitomize a fertile ground for delving into both the functions and uses of implicit communicative strategies.

The proposed panel intends to gather three contributions on qualitative and quantitative approaches to implicit communication. A contribution will tackle the relevance of the Strawman fallacy phenomenon to implicit communication and commitment attributions (Louis de Saussure). Another contribution will propose an analysis of politicians' use of presuppositions and implicatures in Twitter (Davide Garassino & Viviana Masia) and will show some statistical procedures to measure correlations between implicit devices and politicians' communicative styles. A third presentation (Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri et al.) will propose a quantitative approach to the computation of implicit communication in political speeches, homing in on some of the most pervasive pragmatic devices, as well as on their impact on the overall implicitness of a text. On the whole, the following topics (among others) will be broached:

- (1) Persuasive and manipulative communication (The Strawman fallacy theory, etc.): boundaries and definitions;
- (2) Pragmatic and discursive devices relevant for the study of implicit communication phenomena (presuppositions, implicatures, topicalizations, vagueness, etc.);
- (3) Quantification of implicitness in communication: parameters, methods and implementation;
- (4) Statistical methods for measuring the impact of implicit communication in texts.

1: Louis de Saussure - On pragmatic attributions of commitments and the Strawman fallacy *University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland*

The strawman fallacy (SMF) consists in attributing to a Speaker, on the basis of his utterances, thoughts which he didn't actually express. In typical cases, such thoughts are obviously ridiculous or scandalous and the Speaker suffers the reversal of the burden of proof: he has to prove that his thoughts were misinterpreted.

The mere fact that an SMF exists at all rests on the alleged plausibility of a particular pragmatic interpretation. Explicit meanings are usually considered non-retractable whereas implicit meanings are supposed to be so; as a principle, pragmatic interpretations are therefore speculations: they are defeasible and, as such, they should not commit the Speaker (they should not belong to the „commitment store“, Hamblin 1970). It is therefore quite puzzling that making a SMF impairs the argumentative success of its target, not of its author who speculates about a proposition which was not said.

Our explanation for this puzzle starts from the fact that, as widely acknowledged, not only implicit, but also explicit meanings are inferential. We present an experiment where implicit contents were actually considered part of the intentional meaning of the speaker with a very high confidence; we relate this experiment to work by de Saussure & Oswald (2009) who claim that there is a continuum of cases with an overlap between what's considered implicit by the theory and what's actually considered by individuals as a content committing the Speaker. This could explain why pragmatic

interpretations can appear as strongly committing the Speaker, hence reversing the burden of proof.

Yet, even though the SMF relies on pragmatic interpretations, we observe that it can actually be successful as an argumentative move without even being always persuasively efficient. We suggest that this is due to the fact that the victim of a SMF is revealed pragmatically incompetent because he didn't predict the damaging interpretive potential of his behaviour. From this results an image of poor Theory of Mind abilities, which is, in turn, a powerful tool for the author of the fallacy to gain prestige and thus social dominance.

We suggest furthermore that the SMF is more efficient when its content is more relevant in the sense of Sperber & Wilson (1995): the more relevant the SMF, the more the Speaker is expected to predict its possible emergence.

2: Davide Garassino, Viviana Masia & Nicola Brocca– Implicit communication in Twitter: analysing the pragmatic functions of politicians' use of implicatures and presuppositions

University of Zurich, Switzerland & University of Roma Tre, Italy & University of Heidelberg, Germany

Twitter has now become a worldwide means of political propaganda and the role it plays in building ideological consensus is remarkable, due to the immediacy, conciseness and effectiveness of its messages. The present contribution proposes a comparative inquiry into English and Italian politicians' use of implicit communication on Twitter zooming in on two widely debated discourse phenomena: *presupposition* and *implicature*. The analysis also wants to capture interplays between the use of these implicit communicative devices and the fulfilment of specific pragmatic functions in a message. Building on other established taxonomies in the literature, we put forth a four-way classification of the pragmatic functions (attack, stance-taking, self-praise, informative) with which the use of presuppositions, implicatures, or non-implicit strategies is more frequently associated. The statistical analyses conducted to gauge associations between English vs Italian politicians' tweets and given communicative styles show that some implicit strategies are more frequently resorted to in the English political arena, while others are more typical of Italian politicians. Also, the pragmatic functions considered for the analysis seem to characterize more conspicuously specific political groups of either the English or the Italian political scene.

Although the interest in implicit communication has grown rapidly over the last few years, especially with regard to the political domain (Sbisà, 2007; Lombardi Vallauri & Masia, 2014, 2016), studies on communication phenomena in social media such as Twitter are still at dawn of pragmatic research. The present work is an attempt to bring home to a particular means of political propaganda in which communication often draws its strength from what is not said than from what is explicitly said. Needless to say, this is a pervasive trait of persuasive communication in general, but it is interesting to notice that it cuts across diamesic constraints and socio-cultural contexts alike. We believe that, despite its innovativeness, the analysis suggested in the proposed work calls for a richer and more inclusive taxonomy of the implicit categories and pragmatic functions taken under exam, also in the light of a more extended cross-linguistic data sample. We are confident, however, that the methodology put to test might suit some more challenging and promising lines of future investigation in the field of pragmatics and communication in social media.

3: Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri, Laura Baranzini, Doriana Cimmino, Federica Cominetti, Claudia Coppola, Giorgia Mannaioli– Implicit communication: a measuring model

University of Roma Tre, Italy; University of Turin, Italy; University of Basel, Switzerland; University of Florence, Italy & Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna, Italy

Implicit communication can be an effective means of persuasion (Sbisà, 2007; Lombardi Vallauri, 2009b; de Saussure, 2012). In particular, when it comes to questionable contents, this strategy can be exploited for potentially manipulative purposes. In public communication, which is mostly unilateral, this persuasive effect is enhanced.

In order to quantify this phenomenon in actual texts, a measuring model aimed at assessing the impact of implicit information in political speeches has been developed (Lombardi Vallauri & Masia, 2014 and 2016). This computing model assigns relative indexes of implicitness to some major pragmatic categories: presuppositions (Frege, 1892; Stalnaker, 1974; Strawson 1964), implicatures (Grice, 1975; Sbisà 2007) and Topics (Lombardi Vallauri 2009a and 2015). The present contribution aims at introducing a revised version of the model, with respect to both the categories in question and their indexes. The category of vagueness (Lombardi Vallauri 2016) was added to the above mentioned parameters. The indexes have been assigned according to the communicative relevance of each implicit category, on the basis of updated criteria.

The aim of this analytical tool is to measure the amount of questionable information conveyed implicitly in a text and to assign each text a ranking of implicitness relative to other texts. The relevance of the model lies in the use of quantitative criteria, whose consistent application enables a reliable comparison among different texts. An analysis such as the one proposed here, being based on a well-defined protocol, turns an overall impression of politicians' way of speaking into quantitative judgments about their communicative honesty. In addition, since the above-mentioned categories are mainly non-language specific, the model can be potentially applied to any language, so as to carry out cross-linguistic and comparative studies.

Given the importance of the matter at issue for public life, such analyses not only could be considered of scientific and academic interest, but are also worth gaining public attention. Hence a website has been created, where users can not only access speeches delivered by Italian politicians, but also be warned on potentially manipulative practices. This platform will work as a permanent observatory on political propaganda and advertising.

PARTICIPANT INDEX

Last name	First name	E-mail address
Andone	Corina	c.andone@uva.nl
Balbo	Andrea	andrea.balbo@usi.ch
Baranzini	Laura	aura.baranzini@gmail.com
Canale	Damiano	unibocconi@bcdtravel.it
Cigada	Sara	sara.cigada@unicatt.it
Coppola	Claudia	coppolaclau@gmail.com
de Saussure	Louis	louis.desaussure@unine.ch
Galimberti	Carlo	carlo.galimberti@unicatt.it
Greco	Sara	sara.greco@usi.ch
Hannken-Iljjes	Kati	kati.hannkenilljes@uni-marburg.de
Hauser	Stefan	stefan.hauser@phzg.ch
Herman	Thierry	Thierry.Herman@unine.ch
Hornikx	Jos	j.hornikx@let.ru.nl
Jacquin	Jérôme	jerome.jacquin@unil.ch
Jansen	Henrike	h.jansen@hum.leidenuniv.nl
Kunert	Irene	irene.kunert@iued.uni-heidelberg.de
Lewinski	Marcin	m.lewinski@fcsch.unl.pt
Lombardi Vallauri	Edoardo	edoardo.lombardivallauri@uniroma3.it
Luciani	Margherita	margherita.luciani@usi.ch
Luginbühl	Martin	martin.luginbuehl@unibas.ch
Maillat	Didier	didier.maillat@unifr.ch
Mannaioli	Giorgia	giorgia.mannaioli@studio.unibo.it
Manzin	Maurizio	maurizio.manzin@unitn.it
Mazzali-Lurati	Sabrina	sabrina.lurati@usi.ch
Miecznikowski	Johanna	miecznij@usi.ch
Mohammed	Dima	d.mohammed@fcsch.unl.pt
Müller	Misha-Laura	misha-laura.muller@unine.ch
Okubo	Tomonori	tomonori@kansai-u.ac.jp
Oswald	Steve	steve.oswald@unifr.ch
Padilla Cruz	Manuel	mpadillacruz@us.es
Pagliari	Fabio	fabio.pagliari@istc.cnr.it
Paternoster	Annick	annick.paternoster@usi.ch
Perret-Clermont	Anne-Nelly	anne-nelly.perretclermont@unine.ch
Pilgram	Roosmaryn	r.pilgram@uva.nl
Plantin	Christian	Christian.Plantin@univ-lyon2.fr
Pollaroli	Chiara	chiara.pollaroli@usi.ch
Puppo	Federico	federico.puppo@unitn.it
Renardel de Lavalette	Kiki	k.y.renardeldelavalette@uva.nl
Rocci	Andrea	andrea.rocci@usi.ch
Sachinidou	Paraskevi	p.sachinidou@gmail.com
Schär	Rebecca	rebecca.schaer@usi.ch
Schröter	Juliane	juliane.schroeter@zhaw.ch
Schumann	Jennifer	jennifer.schumann@rom.unibe.ch
Scipione	Lucia Cardarelo	lucia.scipione@unimore.it
Serafis	Dimitris	Dimitrios.Serafis@unine.ch
Spanò	Carmen	carmenspano78@gmail.com
Stede	Manfred	stede@uni-potsdam.de
Steen	Gerard	G.J.Steen@uva.nl
Suzuki	Takeshi	takeshi.suzuki@fulbrightmail.org
Tomasi	Serena	serena.tomasi_1@unitn.it
Tuzet	Giovanni	giovanni.tuzet@unibocconi.it
Üzelgün	Mehmet Ali	uzelgun@fsch.unl.pt
van Bijnen	Emma	Emma.van.bijnen@usi.ch
van Haaften	Ton	T.van.Haaften@hum.leidenuniv.nl

Vergine
Wackers
Wagemans
Zampa

Ilaria
Dunja
Jean
Marta

ilaria.vergine@unicatt.it
d.y.m.wackers@uva.nl
j.h.m.wagemans@uva.nl
marta.zampa@zhaw.ch

Università della Svizzera italiana (USI)

Via G. Buffi 13

CH-6904 Lugano, Switzerland

www.argage2018.usi.ch

argage2018@usi.ch

Twitter: @argage2018